Free email security checker
Review the public records behind your domain's email authentication in one place.
Example report
example.com- 1 Low
- 1 Information
- 2 passed
DMARC is in monitoring modeLow
The DMARC policy is p=none, which reports on failing mail but does not stop it.
Next step
Once reports show your legitimate mail passing, move to
p=quarantineand thenp=reject.DKIM could not be confirmedInformationPotential
No DKIM key was found at the 13 common selectors checked. Enter your selector to look it up.
Next step
Confirm in your mail service (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365 and others) that DKIM signing is turned on for the domain.
- SPF
- Non-sending domain protection
Mail servers (MX)
- 1 aspmx.l.google.com
- 5 alt1.aspmx.l.google.com
DMARC record
At _dmarc.example.com
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com| Tag | Value | Means |
|---|---|---|
| v | DMARC1 | Version |
| p | none | Policy for mail that fails |
| rua | mailto:dmarc@example.com | Where aggregate reports go |
SPF record
v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com -all1 of 10 DNS lookups is within the limit receivers allow.
DKIM keys
No key was found at the selectors checked: google, selector1, selector2, default, k1, s1, s2, dkim, mail, smtp, mandrill, mxvault, zoho.
What the email security check looks at
Mail servers
Read the MX records, or the null MX that says no mail is accepted.
SPF
Check the record, how it ends and the lookups it needs.
DMARC
Check the policy, how much mail it covers and where reports go.
DKIM
Look for keys at your selector and 13 common ones.
A domain that sends no mail is checked for the records that say so. Finding no DKIM key at the common selectors does not prove the domain has none.
Understand the issue and your next step
Each finding explains what we found, why it matters and what you can change. Start with the issues that need attention, then open the evidence when you want the detail.
- Enter your domain
- Review the findings
- Follow the fix guides
DMARC is in monitoring modeLow
The DMARC policy is p=none, which reports on failures but does not stop them.
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.comMonitoring mode is the right first step, but it does not protect anyone from spoofed mail until the policy is raised.
Once reports show your legitimate mail passing, move to p=quarantine and then p=reject.
Common email issues you can put right
DMARC is in monitoring modeLow
Your policy can help you understand who sends mail for your domain, but it does not ask receivers to quarantine or reject messages that fail DMARC. Review legitimate senders before changing enforcement.
SPF needs too many DNS lookupsMedium
Each sending service adds its own includes, and past 10 lookups receivers stop evaluating the record. Remove services that no longer send for you first.
Domain without mail is not protected from spoofingLow
A domain that sends no mail can still be forged. Publish records that say it sends none, so receivers refuse mail in its name.
No SPF recordMedium
The domain does not publish an SPF record.
More than one SPF recordMedium
The domain publishes more than one SPF record.
SPF does not reject unlisted sendersHigh
The SPF record ends in
+all(or a bareall), which authorises every server, or in?allor noallat all, which gives servers it does not list a neutral result.SPF record has errorsMedium
The SPF record contains syntax that receivers will reject.
No DMARC policyMedium
No DMARC record was found at _dmarc for the domain.
DMARC is not fully enforcedInformation
The DMARC record relaxes its own policy:
t=y(testing) asks receivers to apply the next milder policy, orpctbelow 100 asks them to apply it to only part of failing mail.DMARC reports are not requestedInformation
The DMARC record has no rua tag, so you receive no aggregate reports.
DMARC record has errorsMedium
The DMARC record could not be parsed.
DKIM could not be confirmedInformation
No DKIM key was found at the common selectors Ironfang checks.
Keep watch after you've fixed it
Ironfang Security rechecks a verified domain every week or every day and tells you what changed: new findings, fixes and certificates nearing expiry.
Free during the preview. Domain verification required.
- NewIssue detected
- FixedConfirmed by recheck
- ReopenedDetected again
How the check works
- MX records: whether the domain receives mail, or publishes a null MX (
0 ., RFC 7505) to say it accepts none. - SPF: exactly one valid
v=spf1record, not ending in+allor?all, that needs no more than 10 DNS lookups. - DMARC: one valid record at
_dmarc.<domain>(or at the organisational domain, for a subdomain without one), its policy, how much mail it covers and whether aggregate reports are requested. - DKIM: keys at up to three selectors you enter and at 13 common selectors, for a domain that sends mail or when you name a selector.
- Non-sending domains: a domain with no MX records, and no SPF record that authorises senders, should publish
v=spf1 -alland a DMARC policy ofp=reject.
Reading a result
The records work together. SPF lists the servers allowed to send for the domain, DKIM publishes the keys that verify signatures on its mail, and DMARC tells receivers what to do with mail that fails both SPF and DKIM alignment with the From address, and where to send reports about it.
Each check passes, raises a finding or does not apply: a domain without MX records is not expected to publish SPF, and DKIM is looked for only where the domain sends mail or you name a selector. A finding names one thing to change and how serious it is. DKIM that could not be confirmed is informational, because selectors cannot be listed from DNS.
Typical findings are a DMARC policy still at p=none, an SPF record pushed past 10 lookups as sending services were added, and a domain that sends no mail but does not say so, which leaves it open to spoofing.
What it does not do
- The check reads public DNS through public resolvers. No mail is sent and no mail server is contacted, so it does not test delivery or how a particular receiver applies your records.
- DKIM keys can only be found at the selectors the check tries, so DKIM that could not be confirmed is not a finding of a problem.
- It checks the domain entered only. SPF is not inherited by subdomains, so each name that sends mail, and each other domain you own, needs its own check.
- It does not look at MTA-STS, TLS reporting (TLS-RPT), BIMI or the mail servers' own configuration.
What happens to the domain you enter
The check runs from Ironfang Security's published scanner address with the same low-impact limits as a scan. Nothing you enter is stored or logged. A result is reused for five minutes, and a certificate log search for an hour, so a repeat check is quick and the domain is not checked again.
Guides
A few things worth knowing
- What is the difference between SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
- SPF lists the servers allowed to send mail for a domain. DKIM signs each message so a receiver can check it was not altered and who signed it. DMARC tells receivers what to do when mail fails both in a way that matches the From address, and sends the domain owner reports.
- Does a domain that sends no email need SPF and DMARC?
- Yes. Unused domains are still used for spoofing. Publish v=spf1 -all and a DMARC policy of p=reject so receivers refuse mail claiming to come from them; a null MX record also says the domain accepts no mail.
- Do I need all three?
- DMARC depends on the other two: it passes when SPF or DKIM passes and aligns with the From domain. SPF alone fails when mail is forwarded, and DKIM alone gives receivers no policy to act on, so set up all three.

