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Free email security checker

Review the public records behind your domain's email authentication in one place.

Reads public DNS only. Nothing is sent to your mail servers. What happens to the domain you enter

Example report

example.com
  • 1 Low
  • 1 Information
  • 2 passed
  • DMARC is in monitoring modeLow

    The DMARC policy is p=none, which reports on failing mail but does not stop it.

    Next step

    Once reports show your legitimate mail passing, move to p=quarantine and then p=reject.

    View fix guide

  • DKIM could not be confirmedInformationPotential

    No DKIM key was found at the 13 common selectors checked. Enter your selector to look it up.

    Next step

    Confirm in your mail service (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365 and others) that DKIM signing is turned on for the domain.

    View fix guide

What the email security check looks at

  • Mail servers

    Read the MX records, or the null MX that says no mail is accepted.

  • SPF

    Check the record, how it ends and the lookups it needs.

  • DMARC

    Check the policy, how much mail it covers and where reports go.

  • DKIM

    Look for keys at your selector and 13 common ones.

A domain that sends no mail is checked for the records that say so. Finding no DKIM key at the common selectors does not prove the domain has none.

Understand the issue and your next step

Each finding explains what we found, why it matters and what you can change. Start with the issues that need attention, then open the evidence when you want the detail.

  1. Enter your domain
  2. Review the findings
  3. Follow the fix guides
Example finding

DMARC is in monitoring modeLow

The DMARC policy is p=none, which reports on failures but does not stop them.

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com

Common email issues you can put right

  • DMARC is in monitoring modeLow

    Your policy can help you understand who sends mail for your domain, but it does not ask receivers to quarantine or reject messages that fail DMARC. Review legitimate senders before changing enforcement.

    Read the fix guide

  • SPF needs too many DNS lookupsMedium

    Each sending service adds its own includes, and past 10 lookups receivers stop evaluating the record. Remove services that no longer send for you first.

    Read the fix guide

  • Domain without mail is not protected from spoofingLow

    A domain that sends no mail can still be forged. Publish records that say it sends none, so receivers refuse mail in its name.

    Read the fix guide

  • No SPF recordMedium

    The domain does not publish an SPF record.

    Read the fix guide

  • More than one SPF recordMedium

    The domain publishes more than one SPF record.

    Read the fix guide

  • SPF does not reject unlisted sendersHigh

    The SPF record ends in +all (or a bare all), which authorises every server, or in ?all or no all at all, which gives servers it does not list a neutral result.

    Read the fix guide

  • SPF record has errorsMedium

    The SPF record contains syntax that receivers will reject.

    Read the fix guide

  • No DMARC policyMedium

    No DMARC record was found at _dmarc for the domain.

    Read the fix guide

  • DMARC is not fully enforcedInformation

    The DMARC record relaxes its own policy: t=y (testing) asks receivers to apply the next milder policy, or pct below 100 asks them to apply it to only part of failing mail.

    Read the fix guide

  • DMARC reports are not requestedInformation

    The DMARC record has no rua tag, so you receive no aggregate reports.

    Read the fix guide

  • DMARC record has errorsMedium

    The DMARC record could not be parsed.

    Read the fix guide

  • DKIM could not be confirmedInformation

    No DKIM key was found at the common selectors Ironfang checks.

    Read the fix guide

Keep watch after you've fixed it

Ironfang Security rechecks a verified domain every week or every day and tells you what changed: new findings, fixes and certificates nearing expiry.

Free during the preview. Domain verification required.

  1. NewIssue detected
  2. FixedConfirmed by recheck
  3. ReopenedDetected again

How the check works

  • MX records: whether the domain receives mail, or publishes a null MX (0 ., RFC 7505) to say it accepts none.
  • SPF: exactly one valid v=spf1 record, not ending in +all or ?all, that needs no more than 10 DNS lookups.
  • DMARC: one valid record at _dmarc.<domain> (or at the organisational domain, for a subdomain without one), its policy, how much mail it covers and whether aggregate reports are requested.
  • DKIM: keys at up to three selectors you enter and at 13 common selectors, for a domain that sends mail or when you name a selector.
  • Non-sending domains: a domain with no MX records, and no SPF record that authorises senders, should publish v=spf1 -all and a DMARC policy of p=reject.

Reading a result

The records work together. SPF lists the servers allowed to send for the domain, DKIM publishes the keys that verify signatures on its mail, and DMARC tells receivers what to do with mail that fails both SPF and DKIM alignment with the From address, and where to send reports about it.

Each check passes, raises a finding or does not apply: a domain without MX records is not expected to publish SPF, and DKIM is looked for only where the domain sends mail or you name a selector. A finding names one thing to change and how serious it is. DKIM that could not be confirmed is informational, because selectors cannot be listed from DNS.

Typical findings are a DMARC policy still at p=none, an SPF record pushed past 10 lookups as sending services were added, and a domain that sends no mail but does not say so, which leaves it open to spoofing.

What it does not do

  • The check reads public DNS through public resolvers. No mail is sent and no mail server is contacted, so it does not test delivery or how a particular receiver applies your records.
  • DKIM keys can only be found at the selectors the check tries, so DKIM that could not be confirmed is not a finding of a problem.
  • It checks the domain entered only. SPF is not inherited by subdomains, so each name that sends mail, and each other domain you own, needs its own check.
  • It does not look at MTA-STS, TLS reporting (TLS-RPT), BIMI or the mail servers' own configuration.

What happens to the domain you enter

The check runs from Ironfang Security's published scanner address with the same low-impact limits as a scan. Nothing you enter is stored or logged. A result is reused for five minutes, and a certificate log search for an hour, so a repeat check is quick and the domain is not checked again.

Guides

A few things worth knowing

What is the difference between SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
SPF lists the servers allowed to send mail for a domain. DKIM signs each message so a receiver can check it was not altered and who signed it. DMARC tells receivers what to do when mail fails both in a way that matches the From address, and sends the domain owner reports.
Does a domain that sends no email need SPF and DMARC?
Yes. Unused domains are still used for spoofing. Publish v=spf1 -all and a DMARC policy of p=reject so receivers refuse mail claiming to come from them; a null MX record also says the domain accepts no mail.
Do I need all three?
DMARC depends on the other two: it passes when SPF or DKIM passes and aligns with the From domain. SPF alone fails when mail is forwarded, and DKIM alone gives receivers no policy to act on, so set up all three.