Skip to content

Free TLS cipher checker

See the cipher suite a website agrees with a modern client, and whether it still accepts broken ones.

Connects on port 443 as a browser would. No login access needed. What happens to the domain you enter

Example report

example.com
  • 1 Medium
  • 3 passed
  • Weak cipher suites acceptedexample.comMedium

    example.com accepted TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA when offered only weak suites.

    Next step

    Restrict the server to modern AEAD cipher suites (AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305).

    View fix guide

What the cipher check looks at

  • Negotiated suite

    See the suite, version and ALPN protocol a modern client gets.

  • Weak suites

    Offer only NULL, export, RC4, DES, 3DES and anonymous suites.

  • What is chosen

    See whether the server picks one of them, and which.

  • Each name

    Test the domain and its www name separately.

Understand the issue and your next step

Each finding explains what we found, why it matters and what you can change. Start with the issues that need attention, then open the evidence when you want the detail.

  1. Enter your domain
  2. Review the findings
  3. Follow the fix guides
Example finding

Weak cipher suites acceptedMedium

The server accepted a connection using a cipher suite that is considered broken or weak.

Offered: NULL, export, RC4, DES, 3DES and anonymous suites
Chosen: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA

Common cipher issues you can put right

  • Weak cipher suites acceptedMedium

    A server that still accepts RC4, 3DES or NULL suites can be talked into weak encryption. Remove them from the server or CDN cipher list, keeping the AEAD suites modern clients use.

    Read the fix guide

  • Website is not available over HTTPSHigh

    The check needs a TLS handshake on port 443. If none completes, the server is not offering HTTPS at all, which matters more than any cipher list. Serve HTTPS with a trusted certificate, then check again.

    Read the fix guide

  • TLS 1.0 is enabledMedium

    Servers that still accept weak suites often still accept TLS 1.0 too. This checker does not test protocol versions; the TLS version checker does. Turn TLS 1.0 off once nothing depends on it.

    Read the fix guide

Keep watch after you've fixed it

Ironfang Security rechecks a verified domain every week or every day and tells you what changed: new findings, fixes and certificates nearing expiry.

Free during the preview. Domain verification required.

  1. NewIssue detected
  2. FixedConfirmed by recheck
  3. ReopenedDetected again

How the check works

  • The suite, protocol version and ALPN protocol (such as h2 for HTTP/2) agreed in a normal handshake on port 443.
  • A second ClientHello, sent at TLS 1.2, listing only broken or weak suites: NULL (no encryption), export-grade, RC4, single DES, 3DES and anonymous key exchange.
  • Whether the server picks one of those suites, and which, or turns the connection down.

Reading a result

In TLS 1.2 and earlier, a suite names the key exchange, the encryption algorithm and the integrity check together, as in ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256. TLS 1.3 cut the list to a handful of suites that all use authenticated encryption (AEAD) and left the broken ones out entirely, so weak suites are a problem of TLS 1.2 and older.

The probe offers nothing but weak suites, so a well-configured server finds no acceptable choice and ends the handshake. If it picks one, a client that supports the same suite could end up using it: RC4 and 3DES have practical attacks against them, NULL suites encrypt nothing, and anonymous suites skip server authentication, which leaves the connection open to interception.

A pass means the server refused every suite in the list. The negotiated suite in the result is the one a modern client is given; a weak-suite finding is about what the server will still agree with a client that asks for less.

What it does not do

  • This is not a cipher enumeration: it does not list every suite the server supports or the order it prefers them in.
  • Suites outside the weak list, such as RSA key exchange without forward secrecy or AES in CBC mode, are not judged.
  • The probe is a TLS 1.2 ClientHello. TLS 1.3 suites are not probed, since none of them is weak.
  • Key sizes, Diffie-Hellman parameters and the strength of the certificate signature are outside this check.

What happens to the domain you enter

The check runs from Ironfang Security's published scanner address with the same low-impact limits as a scan. Nothing you enter is stored or logged. A result is reused for five minutes, and a certificate log search for an hour, so a repeat check is quick and the domain is not checked again.

Guides

A few things worth knowing

What is a cipher suite?
The set of algorithms a TLS connection uses. In TLS 1.2 it covers the key exchange, the bulk cipher and the message authentication; in TLS 1.3 only the cipher and hash, with key exchange agreed separately. Client and server settle on one during the handshake.
Is 3DES still safe to use?
No. Its 64-bit block size makes long-lived connections vulnerable to the Sweet32 attack, and it is much slower than AES. Remove it unless a specific legacy client depends on it, and plan to retire that client.
Which cipher suites should a web server allow?
For TLS 1.3, the defaults. For TLS 1.2, ECDHE key exchange with AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305. Mozilla's server-side TLS guidance and its configuration generator give tested settings for common servers.